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Why the Case for Amending the
U.S. Constitution to Prohibit or Regulate
Gay Marriage is "Not Proved"
by VIKRAM DAVID AMAR AND ALAN BROWNSTEIN*

Conservative and moderate Republicans (and more than a few
Democrats) are waiting to see how vigorously President Bush will

campaign, during his second term, for his proposal to amend the U.S.
Constitution to prohibit recognition by any State of same-sex
marriages. In his January 2005 State of the Union message, the
President reaffirmed his support for the idea, but did not give a sense
of how hard he will push.

Article V of the Constitution lays out amendment procedures.!
One path to amending the Constitution under Article V requires a
two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress, after which a measure will
then be sent out to the States for ratification consideration. At
present, the chances seem slim that the proposal will get a two-thirds
"Vikram Amar is the Harry and Lillian Hastings Research Professor at the University
of California, Hastings College of the Law, and a Visiting Professor of Law at the
University of California at Berkeley. Alan Brownstein is a Professor of Law at the
University of California at Davis School of Law. This piece reflects the substance of
remarks made by Vik Amar at the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly Symposium on
gay marriage held at UC Hastings on February 11, 2005, and is adapted from op-ed and
on-line columns the two authors have written on these topics.
1. Article V provides, in relevant part:
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.... "
U.S. CONST. art. V. Whether Article V's procedures are the only ways to legally amend
the Constitution is a contentious question. For further discussion of this issue, see Vikram
David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce
Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000).
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majority in either house - especially the Senate - but things can
change quickly in Washington.
There is in any event another possible amendment procedure
provided for under Article V: two-thirds of the State legislatures may
call for a "convention" to consider amendments. This route has never
been successfully invoked, but it remains a real possibility in this
context, especially in light of the gains made by anti-gay-marriage
forces in November 2004 in eleven state initiative campaigns. In
short, the issue of a federal constitutional ban on gay marriage
appears unlikely to go away any time soon.
In this short essay, we make some general observations on when
amending the federal Constitution is a wise thing to consider, and
apply those observations to the question of gay marriage.
It is generally recognized that federal constitutional law
entrenches legal principles by taking them outside the normal scope
of the political process. By this, we mean that requirements and
prohibitions embodied in the U.S. Constitution and its interpretation
are very difficult, if not impossible, to displace or even modify
through conventional political channels. Indeed, one might
reasonably say that nothing about the evolution or modification of
constitutional law involves the conventional or normal operation of
democraticpolitics.
Constitutional law develops in two ways. First, constitutional law
unfolds through judge-made interpretations of the Constitution in
U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions. Concededly, there is
a political dimension to judicial rulings - even constitutional decisions
by courts cannot be entirely isolated from the prevalent political
culture of the United States. Yet judicial decisionmaking is not really
political in the same sense that congressional lawmaking is political.
And judicial decisionmaking is certainly not unqualifiedly democratic,
since the will of the current majority - at least as expressed through
current statutes - is often frustrated by what judges do.3
Second, constitutional law evolves through the amendment
process by which the text of the document is itself changed.
2. The states that enacted through direct democratic means anti-gay-marriage
measures in November 2004 were: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana,
Mississippi, Ohio, N. Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex
Bans Fuel Conservative Agenda, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A39.
3. This does not mean that judicial review is ultimately inconsistent with
fundamental democratic principles, insofar as the judicial review is based on enforcing the
Constitution that We the People continue (by our failure to amend it) to exalt as the
highest expression of majority will.
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Compared to judicial decisionmaking, this process is certainly more
overtly political - amending the Constitution is accomplished by a
"campaign" and a voting process that has many similarities to other
elections. Whether it is democratic is a different matter - the
relationship between the amendment process and democracy is
complex.
Begin by noticing that Article V mandates that three-quarters of
the States - what is called a "supermajority" of States, if not of people
- must ratify an amendment before it takes effect. That means, in
practice, that an amendment, in order to succeed, tends to have to
attract overwhelming and geographically broad popular support. It
also means that simple democratic majorities in the future may not be
able to alter the amendment (which would, again, require a threequarters State supermajority) or enact statutes inconsistent with it
(for the Constitution is, by its own terms, the Supreme Law). The
ability of the people in three-quarters of the States to constrain future
decisionmaking by a simple national majority has virtues. But it is
certainly in some tension with a simple definition of democracy as
majority rule, and as rule by the people as they now exist, not as they
once existed.
Finally, whether the amendment process is political and/or
democratic, it certainly cannot be said to be normal or conventional.
To the contrary, the amendment process has been successfully
invoked only sporadically. Put to one side the Bill of Rights (which
essentially came with the constitutional package in 1787), and the
post-Civil War Reconstruction amendments (which were adopted
when much of the United States was under military occupation and
which, accordingly, depended more on the persuasiveness of union
bayonets than political argument).
Other than these, the amendments adopted during our
constitutional history include only fourteen "normal" amendments in
215 years. And two of those - the Eighteenth, establishing alcohol
Prohibition and the Twenty-First, which repeals the Eighteenth more or less cancel each other out. In sum, "extraordinary" is a more
apt description of constitutional amendment than is "conventional."
Constitutional law is entrenched whether it develops through
judicial interpretation or by constitutional amendment. Yet there is
an important sense in which the legal substance of amendments is
particularly difficult to alter. Judicial interpretations of ambiguous
language in the text of the Constitution are susceptible to being
limited or overruled by subsequent judicial decisions. The clarity and
precision of any particular judicial decision or opinion will not

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 32:1

immunize it from subsequent revision or rejection by the Court,
because the Court engaged in the re-interpretative process can claim
the same authority and legitimacy for its analysis as the Court that
issued the initial interpretation of the disputed text. Stare decisis the doctrine that judicial precedent ought to be accorded weight may tend to entrench certain Supreme Court decisions somewhat, but
not all decisions, and not for all time.
Constitutional amendments are different. A clear and precisely
worded amendment cannot as easily be rejected by later judicial
decisions, especially before the Amendment has become dated and
the world has changed significantly due to the passage of time. As
long as an amendment is relatively fresh (a period more likely to be
measured in decades, or even centuries, than mere years), a Court
attempting to alter or negate the amendment's textual command has
significantly less authority and legitimacy than the political process by
which the amendment was ratified.
Over the very long haul, of course, the meaning of even a
precisely crafted constitutional amendment can sometimes be
transformed by judicial interpretation. (Certainly, the current Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment bears little resemblance
to the language of the text.)4 But we submit that doing so is a much
more demanding and costly undertaking for the Court than is a reevaluation of any meaning assigned to a contested constitutional
provision by the Court itself in an earlier case. Put simply, it is much
easier for the Court to second-guess its own judgment than to secondguess a judgment explicitly embodied in a clear constitutional
amendment.
Amending the Constitution thus uniquely immunizes a legal
mandate from both normal political and judicial modification. No
other political act can have such long-term, difficult-to-alter
consequences. While the Constitution itself provides virtually no
substantive constraints on the content of potential constitutional
amendments, these procedural consequences raise serious questions
about the propriety and wisdom of any proposed amendment.
Some commentators have suggested that certain subjects or
topics are particularly appropriate subjects for a constitutional
amendment. For example, some people argue that amendments are
especially proper to establish ground rules for the operation of the
democratic system, such as access to the right to vote. Meanwhile,
4. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425,
1475 (1987).
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others urge that particular issues are distinctively inappropriate for
resolution at the federal constitutional level. Among the examples
given here are health and morality standards - such as the laterrevoked prohibition on the manufacturing, sale, or transportation of
alcoholic beverages.
While these arguments provide relevant
background, we are not sure that, standing alone, they are persuasive
enough to determine the legitimacy of any given amendment. We
suggest today one alternative criterion that, we believe, ought to be of
paramount importance - whether a proposed amendment is being used
to short-circuitongoing democratic deliberation.

Our suggestion here is simple enough: The Constitution ought
not be amended to forestall acceptance of legal developments that are
beginning to receive serious attention and consideration for the first
time, and are starting to gain democratic traction in the polity.
Rather, those kinds of developments should be allowed to be fully
considered in democratic debate.
Enacted at moments of high politics, federal constitutional
amendments embed into our Supreme law principles that are
intended to endure. That is their virtue. But that is also why we must
be careful in adopting them. We should ask, in essence: How will the
mandate we are enshrining in today's proposed amendment look one,
two or five generations from now? How likely is it to stand the test of
time as an expression of principle, and not simply as an exercise of
power? An amendment that cuts off debate precisely at the time
when people's views are evolving stands a high chance of looking
anachronistic and embarrassing, just as the Eighteenth Amendment's
prohibition of alcohol feels so dated and out of touch today.
Some may point out that we were able to "fix" the mistake of the
Eighteenth Amendment by enacting the Twenty-First. Yet the latter
was easily ratified because Congress committed ratification not to
state legislatures, which had ratified the Eighteenth, but to special
ratification conventions in each state. The Eighteenth Amendment's
adoption
by
malapportioned
state legislatures,
perhaps
unrepresentative of public views, may have made it particularly easy
to undo. Thus, the Prohibition experience doesn't diminish the idea
that avoiding
constitutional mistakes in the first place is the wiser
5
course.
Proper amendments should ordinarily seek to codify the
resolution of an issue that already has been sufficiently vetted both by
5. See Vikram Amar, Better to Avoid Mistakes Than Make Amends, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2004, at M3.
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debate and experience. When long-term closure on a particular
question has been reached - closure that would likely exist, more or
less, even without the formalized act of an amendment - an
amendment is appropriate, to memorialize and entrench the
resolution that has been achieved, and to provide courts an
undebatable means of enforcing it.
How do the current proposals to amend the Constitution to ban
same-sex marriage fare under this test? We submit that they fail it
pretty clearly. We believe same-sex marriage opponents can fairly be
characterized as attempting to forestall democratic deliberation over
the long-term on this issue. And as we have noted, an amendment
that has the purpose of doing this is the very kind we consider
inappropriate.
We start with two observations. First, legal rules relating to
marriage have never been constitutionally codified at the national
level. There is no constitutional ban on incestuous marriages
although, historically, the content of consanguinity laws has varied
among the states. There is no constitutional ban on polygamous
marriages-although controversy over this issue came close to
starting a religious war in the United States. No federal constitutional
amendment prohibits a state from recognizing a marriage between an
adult and a child. The Constitution does not even explicitly prohibit
coerced marriages. In all these situations, and with regard to myriad
other questions about the nature and meaning of marriage, state law
and federal statutory law are considered adequate to regulate
marriage.
Moreover, the only times the Constitution has been applied
directly to the regulation of marriage in over two centuries, judgemade constitutional doctrine has limited a State's ability to prevent
people from getting married.6 Accordingly, the use of a constitutional

amendment to restrict marriage arguably bears a greater burden of
justification than an amendment regulating the franchise or officeholding, for example, since the latter subjects are so much more
commonly recognized as the kinds of issues that require
constitutional attention.
Second, it is only fairly recently that many Americans have
begun to focus on, and think critically about, the historical
presumption that marriage should be restricted to heterosexual
couples. Attitudes about homosexuality have changed substantially
6. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374,377 (1978).
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over the last fifteen years. A broadly based dialogue has begun. That
discussion takes place in businesses where companies wrestle with
questions relating to the provision of employment-related benefits to
gay and lesbian couples. It takes place in churches and synagogues as
clergy and congregations debate the morality of recognizing same-sex
relationships for religious purposes. It is addressed in the halls of
Congress, state legislatures, and city councils. And it is reflected in
constitutional litigation evaluating both equal protection claims, and
right of intimate association claims, relating to same-sex relationships.
Moreover, this new dialogue is no longer limited to a small
segment of the population - a narrow class of intellectuals, the gay
community itself, or activist judges. Millions of Americans have
begun to question conventional responses to this issue. Five years
ago, for example, thirty-nine percent of the California electorate
a state-wide initiative restricting marriage to a man and
voted against
7
woman.
a
More importantly, this dialogue is an inter-generational one.
Americans under the age of thirty have strikingly different attitudes
about same-sex marriages than do Americans over the age of sixty.8
Given the reality that this dialogue is just getting under way, and
that there has been so substantial a change in cultural attitudes in a
short period of time, why should our society be contemplating a
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages now?
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the purpose of this
amendment is to prevent this dialogue from continuing. The goal
would seem to be to prevent ongoing discourse and cultural change
that might eventually be reflected in political decision making - in
essence, to short-circuit democratic deliberation about this normative
issue before further changes in political attitudes occur. If successful,
the gay-marriage ban amendment would be the first pre-emptive
constitutional amendment in American history. From a normative, if
7. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, Statewide Measures Submitted to a Vote of Voters (By
County), at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000-primary/measures.pdf (last visited
Apr. 25, 2005).
8. See, e.g., Dana Blanton, Majority Opposes Same-Sex Marriage,FOXNEWS.COM,
Jun. 18, 2004, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,103756,00.html; see also David
Morris & Gary Langer, Same-Sex Marriage: Most Oppose It, But Balk at Amending
at
2004,
Jan.
21,
ABCNEWS.COM,
Constitution,
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Relationships/same-sexmarriage-poll-040121.html.
Jason Mazzone helpfully suggested to one of us that if so-called originalist methodology
has some force because respect for past generations and their wisdom is appropriate,
might not the same be true for future generations whose judgments we can already see
emerging?
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not a legal perspective, it constitutes a misuse of the amendment
process.
As we have discussed, all constitutional amendments have an
entrenching effect to some extent. But our argument above extends
only to amendments to the U.S. Constitution. State constitutions are
so much more easily amended than is their federal counterpart - most
often by a simple majority vote of the state polity - that it is much
harder to argue that such state amendments relating to same-sex
marriage are short-circuiting democracy in the same way.
Further, proposals to amend State constitutions to ban same-sex
marriage are legitimated by the ongoing litigation in many
jurisdictions that seek to use state constitutional law to remove legal
obstacles to such relationships. Perhaps because a political response
to any of their decisions that the polity may reject is so feasible, state
constitutional courts have not displayed as much caution and restraint
as has the United States Supreme Court in developing constitutional
doctrine in this area.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of City
of Los Angeles9 - a case involving a popular initiative that reversed
the California Supreme Court's pro-racial-busing interpretation of
the State constitution - suggests that this distinction is valid.
Crawford implicitly recognized that, if State supreme courts are going
to interpret State constitutions expansively, as many State courts do,
reaching substantially beyond federal constitutional mandates, then
the people of the States must be able to use their political power to
countermand those judicial decisions.
Let us be clear: As a personal matter, we both would oppose
such State constitutional amendments on the merits. But we do not
condemn such efforts in the way that we do condemn anti-same-sexmarriage federal constitutional amendments, as fundamentally
inconsistent with constitutional norms.
All of this brings us, then, to the question whether there are
counterarguments in support of a federal amendment right now that
outweigh the strong presumption against this type of constitutional
change we have just described.
Some proponents argue that a federal constitutional amendment
banning same sex marriage is necessary to head off an imminent
Supreme Court decision that, they predict, will require states to
recognize same-sex marriage as a matter of federal constitutional law.

9. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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Such a ruling is inevitable, they say, due to the logic of Lawrence v.
Texas'° - where the Court invalidated Texas' criminal ban on samesex sodomy. Thus, they assert, a constitutional ban is really an
attempt to promote political resolution of this issue, and avoid having
a complex, value-based issue decided by judicial fiat. Further, they
suggest, since the inevitable Supreme Court opinion recognizing
same-sex marriage would itself prompt an amendment at that time, it
is better to adopt the amendment now, so that the Court's stature is
not diminished by a rapid rebuke by the people of its decision."
Of course, if one takes this argument at face value, then the
proposed amendment's language should be narrowly limited, to say
something like: "Nothing in this Constitution should be understood to
require a state to recognize as a marriage any relationship other than
one between a man and a woman." Any proposed amendment that
reaches beyond this kind of wording simply cannot be justified by the
goal of avoiding a federal judicial mandate on this question. Yet
many supporters of a constitutional amendment have offered much
broader language in their proposals - language that forbids states
from recognizing same-sex marriages within their own borders even if
they so choose."
In any event, we believe that an argument in favor of an
amendment premised on the expectation that the Supreme Court is
about to protect same-sex marriage in the name of the federal
Constitution anytime soon is wrong-headed.
The Court remains moderate, if not conservative - and new Bush
appointees, if there are any, are likely to keep it that way. We find it
more than ironic that while liberal groups ponder the non-trivial
possibility that the right to have an abortion will be overruled in the
next few years, thoughtful conservatives have somehow convinced
themselves that the Supreme Court is on the verge of legalizing samesex marriage in the near future. It just ain't so. Certainly, the Court

10. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
11. Doug Kmiec of Pepperdine Law School made this suggestion at the symposium
event held at UC Hastings on Feb. 11, 2005.
12. For example, supporters of an amendment would add this language to the
Constitution:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the Constitution of any State, nor State or
Federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Rep. Musgrave); see also S.J. Res.
26, 1080h Cong. (2003) (introduced by Sen. Allard).
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nothing in the last decade to suggest that it is ready to
such a radical adventure and move out far in front of the
polity and culture on the gay marriage issue.
true that Lawrence could be seen as a necessary

precondition for such a decision - just as Griswold v. Connecticut,

which implicitly protected non-procreational sexual activity, could be
seen as a necessary precondition for Lawrence itself.
But there was a thirty-eight-year interval between Lawrence and
Griswold, not to mention the Court's decision upholding anti-sodomy
statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick in the interim period. Surely, this
history demonstrates that the ultimate constitutional consequences of
doctrinal foundations are seldom inevitable and rarely imminent.
Even if the Court someday does issue a decision protecting samesex marriage, it might not do so for several decades. Indeed, a
decision rejecting constitutional challenges to restrictions on same-sex
marriage may well precede any future recognition of this equality
right. To argue otherwise is, to our way of thinking, to misread
Lawrence and the current Court's jurisprudence, of which it is a part,
in critical ways.
Importantly, the Lawrence decision did not really involve the
Court breaking new cultural and political ground. Criminal sodomy
laws were seldom enforced, increasingly rejected by state courts and
legislatures, and substantially out of sync with the country's views
about sexuality and fairness. Recent election results regarding samesex marriage paint a very different picture. If opposition to same-sex
marriage is sufficiently strong that getting two-thirds of Congress and
three-quarters of the states to support a constitutional amendment
banning it is even a possibility, then this Court is not going to barge
forward and challenge that orthodoxy.
This is not a Court that rocks the boat on fundamental rights.
Mandating same-sex marriage in the near future would involve
deliberately sailing into an iceberg.
A key problem with predicting a pro-same-sex-marriage
Supreme Court ruling in the near term is that such a ruling would
have to command the support of both Justice Kennedy and Justice
O'Connor. Yet there are strong reasons to doubt that either of these
two Justices would support such a ruling. Justice Kennedy reserves
his passion and constitutional condemnations for what he sees as truly
egregious governmental conduct. He will righteously protect religious
liberty against a naked attempt to suppress a minority faith, as he did
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in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.3 He will
challenge a state constitutional amendment that exposes homosexuals
as a named class to limitless civil disabilities, as he did in Romer v.
Evans.14 And he will prohibit the state from sending adults to jail for
engaging in consensual sexual acts in their bedrooms when that result
seems dramatically inconsistent with conventional norms of fairness
and tolerance, as he did in Lawrence itself.
But Kennedy goes with the cultural flow when decisions have
any plausible, non-invidious justifications that comport with a broadly
majoritarian, national consensus. Thus, he voted to uphold the ban
on partial-birth abortion in Stenberg v. Carhart,5 and comfortably
accepted the government's burdening of the free exercise rights of
Native Americans to use 16peyote in Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith.
As for Justice O'Connor, she often supports abstract standards of
review that would seem to commit the Court to reach liberal results.
Thus, for example, she insists that rigorous review is appropriate
when laws substantially burden religious practice, that government
should not be able to endorse religion, and that the right to have an
abortion should not be unduly burdened. But her applications of
those standards are routinely conventional and conservative.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7
for example, Justice O'Connor concluded that 24-hour waiting
periods and informed consent requirements do not unduly burden
abortion rights. And in Smith and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 8 she upheld the government's significant burdening
of religion. Similarly, Justice O'Connor votes to uphold most
government actions that subsidize religious institutions or express
religious messages.19 In sum, nothing in the jurisprudence of these
two Justices suggests that they are going to dramatically interfere with
the ability of States to determine the parameters of marriage.
13. 508 U.S. 520, 523 (1993).
14. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
15. 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000).
16. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
17. 505 U.S. 833, 883-87 (1992).
18. 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 891.
19. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres:
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution,51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 126 (1990); Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respectfor Religious Liberty and
Religious Equality: Justice O'Connor's Interpretationof the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 837,864 (2001).
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Finally, yet another problem with predicting a pro-same-sex
marriage opinion from the Court is that, in a very real sense, the
decisions in Romer and Lawrence may actually argue in favor of
reserving questions about same-sex marriage for ordinary political
deliberation.
Laws imposing civil disabilities on persons with homosexual
orientations, as the State constitutional provision in Romer did, or
criminalizing homosexual conduct, as the statute in Lawrence did,
constitute significant impediments to gay people engaging in the
political process. Effective political activity requires the ability of
actors to identify themselves as members of the class whose interests
they are promoting. With laws such as these, where public
acknowledgment of one's status as a gay person could subject one to
civil or criminal sanction, political conduct is necessarily chilled.
(Think about religion as an illustration of this point. If it is against the
criminal law to practice Judaism, and even non-practicing Jews are
subject to civil sanctions, then membership in the American Jewish
Congress and similar groups is going to decline precipitously.)
Viewed this way, cases invalidating such laws may not set the
stage for a pro-same-sex-marriage Supreme Court ruling at all. By
protecting gay people from persecution and prosecution, Romer and
Lawrence open and level the political playing field. They make
possible the kind of free and frank dialogue that civil disabilities and
sodomy laws chilled and distorted. Given these holdings, one might
argue, there is no reason for the Court to precipitously cut off the
very discussions its decisions have made possible.
For all these reasons, we find the argument that an anti-same-sex
marriage amendment is necessary to preempt a pro-same-sexmarriage U.S. Supreme Court decision entirely unpersuasive. Let us
go on, then, to examine the proposed amendment on its merits.
Constitutional amendments involve a mix of law and policy. We
have argued why, as a matter of constitutional law, a federal
amendment banning same-sex marriage is simply not proper or
necessary. Although we have no claim to special expertise when it
comes to social policy, we believe that the character of the institution
of marriage, as it has been understood by courts and modern
commentators, also militates against enshrining into our supreme law
a ban on same-sex marital unions.
Indeed, turning to the substance of the controversy, we think the
conflict over same-sex marriage has distorted discussion about the
institution of marriage in extraordinary ways. Whether or not there
are any plausible reasons for reserving the label of marriage for
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heterosexual couples only, we feel that proponents of amending the
Constitution often rely on specious arguments. Longstanding and
widely-accepted propositions about the nature of marriage - relating
to the individual and social benefits of monogamy, personal
responsibility, and commitment - seem to have been summarily cast
aside for no other reason than that they are incidentally or directly
inconsistent with arguments opposing same-sex unions.
Important and complex social institutions such as marriage serve
multiple functions. Clearly, one of those is functions is to provide a
stable foundation for the raising of children. It does no disservice to
this goal, however, to recognize that marriage serves other
independently valuable purposes as well. This is just common sense.
Freedom of speech is no less intrinsic to the operation of democratic
self-government if we also recognize that this right serves other
purposes, such as the affirmation of personal autonomy.
But many opponents of same-sex marriage insist marriage is
primarily about only one objective - procreation and the preservation
of the species. Indeed, it is on this issue that debate about same-sex
marriage simply falls apart - with proponents of such marriages
shaking their heads in disbelief, and trying to find some tactful way to
say that the arguments of opponents seem unintelligible.
To put it simply, in our view, marriage is about children,
commitment and responsibility, and love and sex. Let's take the bull
by the horns and talk about the last factor first. Sex is a powerful
force in most people's lives. Entirely unconstrained, it can be
disruptive, abusive, and even dangerous. Both the individuals
involved and society benefit when sexual activities occur in loving,
long-term, monogamous relationships.
This is true whether or not a couple has children. It is true for
gays and lesbians as well as heterosexuals. Relationships of this kind
further personal and public health goals, social stability, psychological
well-being, and for most people, personal happiness.
The institution of marriage promotes loving, long-term,
monogamous relationships which in turn further the aforementioned,
valuable social and personal purposes. Prior to the debate about
same-sex marriage, we thought the above contention was a
fundamental axiom of conservative thought. Today, however, this
basic understanding seems to have been forgotten by conservatives.
Liberals who are traditionalists about marriage, like us, simply cannot
understand this change in attitude.
Recognizing the role that marriage plays in providing a
constrained and positive framework for the expression of sexual
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feelings is intrinsic to our understanding of the meaning and scope of
this institution. That is why arguments by opponents of same-sex
marriage about extending marriage to two brothers or a mother and
daughter living together are irrelevant. Those relationships aren't
sexual in nature. Providing a framework for sexual intimacy to take
place is one of the unique virtues of marriage as a formal institution.
This understanding of marriage has important ramifications for
the same-sex marriage debate. Restricting marriage to heterosexual
couples deprives gay couples and society of the value of this
formalized sexual constraint. Assuming that most gays and lesbians
will neither be transformed into heterosexuals or disappear, the
alternatives to long term, loving, monogamous relationships between
gay people are celibacy and promiscuity. The former is absurdly
unrealistic, and the latter is far less beneficial and much more
problematic - again, both for the individuals involved and society. It
is difficult to understand why conservatives, in particular, seem
entirely unconcerned about the societal consequences of their
position.
The second-to-last factor is commitment and responsibility.
Again, we are bewildered. When did this become an unimportant
aspect of marriage - its importance limited to the extent that it helps
to maintain a stable environment for the raising of children?
In a society committed to rampant individualism and
materialism, one individual's respect for and caring for another for
the long term, putting his or her own interests aside to help his or her
partner, is of great value - both for the individuals whose lives are
made more secure, and for society, which benefits both from this
example of personal responsibility and the tangible care that marital
partners provide to each other.
These virtues are never doubted when infertile and/or elderly
heterosexuals get married. These marriages show, of course, that
procreation is not the exclusive purpose of marriage. But on a deeper
level, they also show that the other things that marriage accomplishes
are profoundly valuable and deserving of promotion.
These
marriages are not simply tolerated. They are celebrated with
enthusiasm as wonderful events in the lives of the individuals
involved. Marriage for these people is a positive good, not something
the state grudgingly allows.
Moreover, non-procreative marriages are not some rare and
aberrant occurrence. The population for whom non-procreative
marriage is at least a possibility is extraordinarily large. For most
people, child bearing does not occur after the age of 45. Let's add ten
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years to that. Marriages between people who are over 55 do not
serve procreative functions. That's a class of over 60 million people,
over a fifth of the population of the United States. Over 23 million
people in that class are not married. Are all weddings within that
class purposeless?
But that's not all. Over 2 million married couples under the age
of 45 are infertile. That's about 7% of the married couples in the
country.
Then there are couples who are capable of having children but
who are deliberately childless. Statistics are less clear here, but we
are probably talking about at least 6% of the married couples in the
United States. Viewed from another perspective, 18% of women
between the age of 40 and 44-that is, women who are very near the
end of their childbearing years-have never had a child.
Is marriage meaningless for all the individuals in these
overlapping cohorts? Unless we are prepared to demean the marital
relationships of millions of our friends, neighbors and colleagues as
purposeless and valueless rituals, descriptively as well as normatively,
marriage cannot be limited to procreation.
We know that many opponents of same-sex marriage argue that
such unions undermine the utility of marriage as the primary
institution for the raising of children. That harm, some say, offsets
any benefits extending marriage to same-sex couples provides. We
leave that discussion for another time. But at least that argument
recognizes the other purposes and value of marriage, even though it
suggests that they are in tension with the institution's procreative
function.
When opponents of same sex marriage deny or trivialize the
other purposes of marriage we have described, we are left speechless.
That is the argument we simply do not understand, and which, in our
view, cannot possibly justify an amendment to the Constitution.
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